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Abstract The most influential approaches to reciprocals (Heim, Lasnik & May
1991; Dalrymple, Kanazawa, Kim, Mchombo & Peters 1998) involve a scoping
operator, but there are good arguments by Murray (2008) and Dotlacˇil (2013)
that reciprocals do not involve distributive quantification but are instead pronouns
with both coference and noncoreference requirements. However, the latter analyses
cannot straighforwardly account for apparent scopal variability in complex sentences
with reciprocals. In this paper we extend the pronominal analysis of reciprocals
to long distance cases by extending the original plural CDRT (Brasoveanu 2007)
analysis with ideas from partial CDRT (Haug 2014).
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1 Introduction
The most influential approaches to reciprocals (Heim et al. 1991; Dalrymple et al.
1998; Beck 2001) treat them – in one way or another – as strongly distributive
quantifiers that can scope at various points in the sentence. On the face of it, these
theories are well equipped to deal with what look like scope ambiguities in reciprocal
sentences (1), and in particular the so-called long distance reciprocal reading that we
see in (1b).
(1) Two girls thought that they saw each other.
a. Both girls thought: “We saw each other” (“narrow scope”)
b. Both girls thought: “I saw her (= the other)” (“wide scope”)
Nevertheless, more recent analyses (Murray 2008; Dotlacˇil 2013) bring evidence that
reciprocals do not involve distributivity. Instead, these analyses view each other as a
pronoun with both coference requirements (identity of group) and noncoreference
requirements (different individuals chosen in each verifying situation).
We find the evidence in favour of a pronominal analysis of each other compelling.
But the resulting theories lack an account of the apparent scopal variability that
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we observe in (1). The goal of the present paper, then, is to extend the empirical
coverage of Murray and Dotlacˇil’s theories to deal with the readings in (1). We do
this by combining the framework used by Dotlacˇil (2013), Plural Compositional
DRT (Brasoveanu 2007),1 with Partial Compositional DRT (Haug 2014). This will
allows us to pursue an analysis along the lines of the intuition expressed by Williams
(1991) whereby the ambiguity we see in (1) is the same as the one we see in (2).
(2) Two girls thought that they would win.
a. Both girls thought: “We will win” (“narrow scope”)
b. Both girls thought: “I will win” (“wide scope”)
To our knowledge, no analysis based on this – to our mind compelling – intuition
has ever been spelled out in detail. As we make the analysis precise, however, we
will see that Williams’ claim that the two ambiguities are exactly the same cannot be
upheld. On the reading in (1b), the embedded clause in (1) contains a reciprocal,
although the beliefs that it reports do not. So our analysis will have to capture that
fact.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we go through the evidence
against a scoping distributive quantifier in the semantics of reciprocals. In section
3, we introduce Plural CDRT and lay out Dotlacˇil’s analysis of basic reciprocal
sentences. In section 4, we show how this analysis can be extended to account for
apparent scopal variability by combining it with the analysis of anaphora from Haug
(2014). Section 5 concludes.
2 Against scope in reciprocals
At first sight, accounts based on a scoping quantifier easily account for the data in
(1). If, following Dalrymple et al. (1998), we take the reciprocal to be a polyadic
quantifier recip that takes a plurality and a dyadic relation, we can schematically
represent the two readings as in (2).
(3) a. think(girls, recip(girls, λx.y.x saw y)
b. recip(girls, λx.y.x think that x saw y)
However, as has been pointed out a number of times (Williams 1991), things are
not actually that simple. One fundamental problem is that there is a strict limitation
on the scope of the reciprocal: it can never scope higher than the highest binder of
its local antecedent, as illustrated in (4). Without further stipulations, the quantifier
approaches have no account of this.
1 Murray’s analysis is cast in the related framework Dynamic Plural Logic (van den Berg 1996).
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(4) Some think they like each other.
a. Some think: “They like each other”.
b. *For each of them there are some who think: “He likes the other”.
Besides overpredicting scope possibilities, accounts based on a strongly distributive
quantifier run into problems with elementary reciprocal sentences.
Limited scope of distributivity Already Williams (1991) argued that reciprocals
pattern with plurals rather than with strongly distributive quantifiers when it comes
to the availability of distributive readings. The facts are quite complicated, since
ordinary plurals can give rise to distributive readings in many contexts. The best
argument comes from examples like (5).
(5) Two children gave each other five Christmas presents.
(5) has a cumulative reading where there are a total of five presents and for each of
the presents, the first child gave it to the second child or vice versa. Accounts that
rely on distributivity or quantification in reciprocal sentences cannot capture this
reading.
It is also worth mentioning that each other does not behave like a quantifier with
respect to other scope-taking items either, as discussed in Asudeh (1998: chapter
6). Perhaps the clearest examples involve modal verbs: every but not each other can
scope over a modal verb (6).
(6) a. John and Mary may beat everyone to the finish line. (∀ > may, may > ∀)
b. #John and Mary may beat each other to the finish line. (*each other >
may, #may > each other)
Multiple reciprocals Another problem for accounts that rely on distributivity
comes from sentences with multiple reciprocals (7).
(7) John and Mary read each other’s books in each other’s languages. (Heim
et al. 1991)
(8) Two girls gave each other pictures of each other.
Because the higher each other distributes down to atoms, there is no plurality
available for the lower each other. Distributivity accounts are therefore forced to
postulate a mechanism of “absorption” (Heim et al. 1991: 94) whereby the multiple
distributors fuse into one distributor binding several argument positions. Everything
else equal, it would of course be preferable to do without this stipulation.
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Cross-linguistic coverage In many languages, reciprocity and reflexivity are ex-
pressed by the same means, either a verbal affix (e.g. Cheyenne) or an independent
word (e.g. German sich, as well as many Slavic and Romance languages). Impor-
tantly, such constructions typically also license ‘mixed’ readings between reciprocity
and reflexivity (see Murray 2008: 466-67 for Cheyenne and Cable 2014: 4–5 for
German and Romance), showing that they are not ambiguous but rather have a
single, underspecified meaning. This is problematic for accounts that rely on a
distributive quantifier, because there are no common meaning components between
reflexivity and reciprocity, let alone a way of providing an underspecified semantics.
On the other hand, we will see below how a plural DRT account can easily get the
underspecified meaning, as argued by Murray (2008).2
3 Reciprocals through cumulation
3.1 Plural CDRT
To see how the cumulative analysis of reciprocals works in plural CDRT, we first
briefly introduce the framework. Plural CDRT is built on top of CDRT, which is a
way of making DRT compositional by introducing separate types for registers (aka
discourse referents) and information states, and thereby handling assignments in the
object language rather than in the metalanguage. The appeal of CDRT is that all this
complexity can be hidden in abbreviations which look like ordinary DRSs which we
can lambda abstract over. In this way, (9a) can get the semantic representation in
(9b), which looks like an ordinary DRS but really is the abbreviation of (9c).
(9) a. A cat appeared.
b.
x1
cat(x1)
appear(x1)
c. λ i.λo.i[x1]o∧ cat(ν(o)(x1))∧appear(ν(o)(x1))
In (9c), i and o are information states, x1 is a discourse referent, and ν is a non-logical
constant which interprets discourse referents in particular states, which means that
ν(o)(x1) denotes an individual. We write i[x1]o for ‘states i and o differ at most with
respect to the individual assigned to x1’, i.e. ∀y.y 6= x1→ ν(i)(y) = ν(o)(y). (9c)
therefore denotes a relation between states i and o such that they differ only in the
2 Cable (2014) also notes that on the cumulative analysis of plurals, reflexives are in fact expected to
be underspecified with respect to reciprocity, reflexivity and mixed readings.
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interpretation of x1, and ν assigns some individual to x1 in o such that that individual
is a cat and appears. For more details of how this works, we refer to Muskens 1996.
In this paper, we will mostly be able to stay at the abbreviated level, although we
will make some references to the underlying type-logic in this section.
Plural CDRT adapts van den Berg 1996 to the compositional CDRT setting.
The leading idea is to model plurality by having DRSs be not relations between
information states, but relations between sets of information states, which we will
call plural information states. A plural information state satisfies a DRS condition
iff its component information states pointwise satisfy the condition.
Having plural information states means that a single discourse referent can range
over multiple individuals across the assignments in each plural state. This makes
introduction of new discourse referents a little more complicated. Here we follow
Brasoveanu (2007) and say that when a new discourse referent x is introduced,
for each input assignment i there is an output assignment o that differs at most
with respect to x; and for each output assignment o there is an input assignment
i that differs at most with respect to x. Moreover, because we are quantifying
over assignments, we need to exclude the degenerate case where the set of output
assignments is empty, so we include a condition O 6= /0. We can then define the
introduction of a a discourse referent in a plural information state as in (10).
(10) I[x1]O =de f ∀i ∈ I.∃o ∈ O.i[x1]o∧∀o ∈ O.∃i ∈ I.i[x1]o∧O 6= /0.
In the DRS language, I[x1]O will come out as the declaration of x1 in the universe of
the DRS.
We also need a notion of a plural information state satisfying a condition. Plural
CDRT takes pointwise satisfaction of conditions as the default, i.e. for the plural
information state O to satify a condition R(x1), every assignment in O must provide
a value for x1 such that R(ν(o)(x1)) holds. So, whenever a condition R(x1) appears
in a DRS, this abbreviates the lambda expression in (11).
(11) R(x1) =abbr ∀o ∈ O.R(ν(o)(x1))
Putting all this together, we can analyze a sentence with a plural as in (12).
(12) a. Cats appeared.
b.
x1
cat(x1)
appear(x1)
c. λ I.λO.I[x1]O∧∀o ∈ O.cat(ν(o)(x1))∧appear(ν(o)(x1))
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Again, (12a) is assigned the DRS-like interpretation (12b), which conveniently hides
the type theoretical expression (12c). A plural information state O will satisfy (12c)
in case it extends an input assignment I with values for x1 such that each individual
in x1 is a cat who appeared.
But how can we impose a plurality constraint e.g. for two cats appeared? The
answer is that we need to sum across assignments. We define such collective
satisfaction predicates in (13).
(13) R(∪x) =abbr λO.R(
⋃
o∈Oν(o)(x))
With this in place, we get (14).
(14) a. Two cats appeared.
b.
x1
cat(x1)
2.atoms(∪x1)
appear(x1)
c. λ I.λO.I[x1]O∧∀o ∈ O.cat(ν(o)(x1))∧2.atoms(⋃o∈Oν(o)(x1))∧
appear(ν(o)(x1))
Notice that we get cumulative readings as the default case for polyadic predicates
with two or more plural arguments, e.g. (15).
(15) a. Two cats ate three mice.
b.
x1 x2
cat(x1)
2.atoms(∪x1)
mouse(x2)
3.atoms(∪x2)
eat(x1,x2)
c. λ I.λO.I[x1 x2]O∧∀o ∈ O.cat(ν(o)(x1))∧2.atoms(⋃o∈Oν(o)(x1))
∧ mouse(ν(o)(x2))∧3.atoms(⋃o∈Oν(o)(x2))∧ eat(ν(o)(x1),ν(o)(x2))
On this analysis, x1 will range over two cats, x2 over three mice, and in each
assignment it is true that x1 ate x2, so we get a cumulative reading.
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3.2 Reciprocals in Plural CDRT
Because cumulative predication is the default case, we can capture reciprocity as
cumulative identity between each other and its antecedent across assignments,
combined with a distinctness condition inside each assignment. This yields the
meaning in (16), from Dotlacˇil 2013.3
(16) Jeach otherunumK= λP.
un
∪um = ∪un
um 6= un
;P(un)
That is, each other introduces a new discourse referent un, which is anaphoric to
another referent um, and requires that un and um are sum equal across assignments,
but different in each assignment. (17) shows how this works for an elementary
reciprocal predication.
(17) a. Two girls1 saw each other21
b.
x1 x2
2.atoms(∪x1)
girl(x1)
∪x1 = ∪x2
x1 6= x2
see(x1,x2)
c.
x1 x2
j1 girl1 girl2
j2 girl2 girl1
We see that the NP two girls introduces a discourse referent x1 which must have two
atoms in its denotation across assignments, and each atom must be a girl. each other
then introduces a new discourse referent which ranges over the same individuals
across assignments but is distinct in reference inside each assignment. Finally, each
assignment must be such that x1 sees x2. A sample output state is given in (17c).
The reciprocal, then, has two crucial components that link it to its antecedent:
a coreference requirement which is interpreted cumulatively, and a distinctness
criterion which is interpreted distributively.
3 In fact, Dotlacˇil (2013) formulates the semantics in a different way in terms of an explicit distribution
operator, but the two definitions are equivalent.
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This analysis solves all the problems that the scopal analysis has with basic re-
ciprocal sentences which were illustrated in section 2. The analysis of the cumulative
reading of (5) is as in (18b). (18c) gives a sample verifying output state (among
many).
(18) a. Two children gave each other five Christmas presents
b.
x1 x2 x3
2.atoms(∪x1)
child(x1)
∪x1 = ∪x2
x1 6= x2
presents(x3)
5.atoms(∪x3)
give(x1,x2,x3)
c.
x1 x2 x3
j1 child1 child2 pres1
j2 child2 child1 pres2
j3 child1 child2 pres3
j4 child2 child1 pres4
j5 child1 child2 pres5
Multiple reciprocals are also no problem. (19) gives the analysis of (8) on the
reading where the second reciprocal takes the first one as its antecedent. (There is
another reading, also unproblematic, where both reciprocals takes the subject as
their antecedent.)
(19) a. Two girls1 gave [each other]2 pictures3 of [each other]4.
b.
x1 x2 x3 x4
2.atoms(∪x1)
girls(x1)
∪x1 = ∪x2
x1 6= x2
∪x2 = ∪x4
x2 6= x4
pictures.o f (x3,x4)
give(x1,x2,x3)
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c.
x1 x2 x3 x4
j1 girl1 girl2 pic1 girl1
j2 girl2 girl1 pic2 girl2
Finally, we note that, as observed by Murray (2008), the cumulative semantics makes
it easy to model a meaning that is underspecified between reflexivity and reciprocity
(as discussed above in section 2) by simply leaving out the distinctness criterion
from (16), as shown in (20).
(20) Jrecip/reflunumK= λP.
un
∪um = ∪un ;P(un)
In sum, we take these data to strongly favour the pronominal theory of the reciprocal,
as developed by Murray and Dotlacˇil. We now pass to our own contribution, which
is to develop an account of long distance readings within this setting.
4 Deriving scopal variability
As is standard in dynamic semantics, plural CDRT models anaphoric relations
through identification of variables/discourse referents. Following CDRT this iden-
tification is assumed to arise from a pre-semantic coindexation mechanism. This
means that our example (1) actually looks like (21) in the input to semantics.
(21) Two girls1 said that they1 saw each other21.
Given (16), the only way to “parametrize” the meaning of the reciprocal is to vary
the antecedent, but there is only one index available as antecedent in (21). So it
should be clear that the account is not fine-grained enough to capture the apparent
scopal variability that we see in (1a–b). We will now see how we can endow CDRT
with a more fine-grained account of anaphoric dependencies which will be able to
solve this problem.
4.1 Partial CDRT
There have been several uses of partiality in dynamic semantics. One conceptual
reason is that it provides for a very natural notion of information growth: if assign-
ments are partial we can model discourse referent introduction as extension of a state.
i[x]o as defined above is an equivalence relation partitioning the set of assignments,
and its plural version I[x]O inherits this behaviour. But the more natural notion of
discourse referent introduction is arguably asymmetric. And indeed van den Berg’s
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original Dynamic Plural Logic was partial, although Brasoveanu’s compositional
version is not. In a partial setting, we can recast i[x]o as in (22), which intuitively
says that i extends o with a value for x.
(22) i[x]o := ¬∃y.ν(i)(x) = y∧∃y.ν(o)(x) = y∧∀z.z 6= x→ ν(i)(z) = ν(o)(z).
We can generalize this to the relation between sets of assignments I[x]O in exactly
the same way as before.
The particular partial logic we are basing ourselves on comes from Haug (2014).
The prime motivation for partiality in that paper is the underspecification of anaphoric
relationships. This is achieved by having states track occurrences of discourse
referents rather than discourse referents themselves. That is, in partial CDRT, Mary
and she will introduce different discourse referents even if they corefer, whereas
in other versions of DRT, they will be the same discourse referent in that case.
However, as an anaphoric expression, she is associated with a condition that it must
corefer with an antecedent, whose identity is supplied by pragmatics and tracked by
a function A mapping anaphoric expressions to their antecedent. Consider (23).4
(23) a. Mary was happy. She had won.
b.
x1 x¯2
Mary(x1)
happy(x1)
had.won(x2)
, A (x2) = x1
c. λ i.λo.∂ (i[x1 x2]o)∧Mary(ν(o)(x1))∧happy(ν(o)(x1))∧had.won(ν(o)(x2))∧
∂ (ν(o)(x2) = ν(o)(A (x2))
The overbar on x¯2 in the DRS in (23) abbreviates the condition ∂ (ν(o)(x2) =
ν(o)(A (x2)) (where ∂ is the presupposition connective of Beaver (1992), mapping
True to True and other truth values to undefined) and the actual identity A (x2) is
supplied “on the side”, not as part of the semantic content because the grammar does
not specify the antecedent. However, underspecification as such is not relevant for
our purposes: what is relevant is that coreference is modeled not as reuse of variables
but as an identity condition between variables. Therefore we will allow ourselves
to abbreviate the DRS from (23) as (24), where we also ignore the presupposition
operator and the overbar indicating anaphoricity.
4 Another aspect of PCDRT is that discourse referents are ordered, so that x1 and x2 in (23c) are the
first free discourse referents in i and should be written xi1 and xi2 in the full representation. This
aspect of the theory is not relevant here.
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(24)
x1 x2
Mary(x1)
happy(x1)
had.won(x2)
x2 = x1
From our perspective, this abbreviation has two advantages: we suppress the A
function since we are not interested in underspecification; and we bring to the fore
the identity condition associated with anaphora. In the singular case, (24) has the
same truth conditions as what we would get by substitution of identities, but in the
plural case, the contribution of identity conditions is more interesting, especially in
intensional contexts.
By default, an identity condition should be interpreted inside each assignment,
just like other conditions. That is, the contribution of an anaphoric identity condition
like x1 = x2 is as in (25).
(25) x1 = x2 : ∀o ∈ O.ν(o)(x1) = ν(o)(x2)
Let us now see how this plays out in embedded contexts like our original example
(2). To deal with attitude verbs we will need to have an intensional language. Here
we just assume that conditions have an implicit world argument and a DRS denotes
a set of worlds such that all conditions in the DRS are satisfied. Moreoever, we
associate each individual x with a set of worlds doxx which characterizes the contents
of their thoughts (in a particular world). We can then define an interpretation of
conditions like think(x,K) where K is some DRS as in (26).
(26) think(x,K) = λO.∀o ∈ O.∃O′.doxν(o)(x) ⊆ K(O)(O′)
(26) says that think(x,K) is true iff the thoughts of x are compatible with K as
interpreted in the embedding plural information state O. That is, the embedded
DRS has access to the entire plural information state of the matrix DRS, so that an
anaphoric identity condition in the subordinate DRS pointing to a matrix discourse
referent will make the anaphoric discourse referent range over all the values of the
matrix discourse referent.
(27) a. Two girls1 thought they2 would win.
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b.
x1
girl(x1)
2.atoms(∪x1)
think
(
x1,
x2
x2 = x1
win(x2)
)
This DRS is satisifed in the plural information state J1 as illustrated in (28) iff each
girl thinks that each girl will win, because (26) ensures that the embedded DRS is
interpreted across the whole information state for each girl’s thoughts.
(28)
x1 x2
J1 j1 girl1 girl1
j2 girl2 girl2
Although (28) may look like there is a binding relation between x1 and x2, implying
that each girl thinks only that she herself will win, the definition in (26) ensures that
the whole information state J1 must verify the embedded DRS in each girl’s thought
worlds, i.e. each girl thinks that each girl (= each value of x2 across all of J1) will
win.
We assume, however, that there is another way of satisfying attitude predicates.
The idea is that the thoughts of x are characterized by K only as interpreted in
the discourse context O restricted to the assignments where x actually denotes the
believer. This is shown in (29).
(29) thinkp(x,K) = λO.∀o ∈ O.∃O′.doxν(o)(x) ⊆ K(O|x=ν(o)(x))(O′)
Here we write O|x=ν(o)(x) for the subset of O which agrees with o on the value for x.
If we interpret think in (27a) this way, we get the information state J1 in (28). The
reason is that only one value for x1 goes into the embedded DRS, and so summing
over that value yields the same result.
Notice that although we use think and thinkp to abbreviate (26) and (29) we do
not think of the difference as a lexical ambiguity. It is more like a transparent/opaque
distinction for anaphoric conditions. Observe first that (26) and (29) yield exactly
the same interpretation of non-anaphoric conditions, since the only way a variable
in the embedded DRS can be bound in the input information state (rather than the
output) is if it comes from an anaphoric condition. What (29) then does is to license
a transparent interpretation of the anaphoric condition such that the whole identity
condition only holds in the matrix DRS, whereas the subject’s doxastic alternatives
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only contain parts of the identity conditions, namely the ones involving the subject
him/herself.
There is one more reading that we would like to get. That is the so-called crossed
reading where girl1 thinks girl2 will win and vice versa. This is not a salient reading
of (2) and there are even claims in the literature that it does not exist. However, as
we will see below, we believe this claim is incorrect. And in fact, our system can
get the crossed reading. Two ingredients are crucial. First, we must interpret the
anaphoric condition cumulatively, as defined in (30).
(30) ∪x1 = ∪x2 :⋃o∈Oν(o)(x1) =⋃o∈Oν(o)(x2)
This is no different from the collective interpretation of other conditions, defined in
(13). In addition, the introduction of the pronoun’s discourse referent must be lifted
to the matrix DRS, since thinkp does not give access to the whole matrix information
state inside the embedded DRS. This yields the analysis in (31a).
(31) a. Two girls1 thought they2 would win.
b.
x1 x2
girl(x1)
2.atoms(∪x1)
∪x2 = ∪x1
thinkp
(
x1,
x2
win(x2)
)
(31a) is compatible with the information state J2 from (32).
(32)
x1 x2
J2 j1 girl1 girl2
j2 girl2 girl1
If we now interpret K in a partitioned manner, we get the crossed reading. We think
that is a welcome result, but the rarity of such readings suggests that the cumulative
interpretation of the anaphoric identity condition is a marked option.
4.2 Application to reciprocals
The analysis of the “narrow scope” reading (27a) above transfers directly to the
“narrow scope” reading of the reciprocal in (1a), as shown in (33).
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(33) a. Two girls1 thought that they2 had seen each other3.
b.
x1
girl(x1)
2.atoms(∪x1)
think
(
x1,
x2 x3
x2 = x1
see(x2,x3)
∪x3 = ∪x2
x3 6= x2
)
c.
x1 x2 x3
j1 girl1 girl1 girl2
j2 girl2 girl2 girl1
We correctly capture that the two girls had the thought expressed by the embedded
DRS as interpreted in whole plural information states, that is “we saw each other”.
Notice however that if we switch to thinkp, it does not make sense to leave
the reciprocal in the embedded DRS. That is because the partitioned information
states are not guaranteed to contain a plurality which can serve as an appropriate
antecedent for the reciprocal.5 The problem comes from the fact that on the wide
scope reading, the sentence does not report on any reciprocal thought: both girls
thought “I saw her”, so the reciprocity is the speaker’s responsibility and only exists
at the level of the matrix DRS. The analysis then is as in (34).
(34) a. Two girls1 thought that they2 had seen each other3.
5 Another way to think about this is that thinkp yields a transparent interpretation of anaphoric
connections, as noted above, so it does not make sense to interpret the reciprocal in an opaque way in
the embedded DRS.
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b.
x1 x2 x3
girl(x1)
2.atoms(∪x1)
x2 = x1
∪x3 = ∪x2
x3 6= x2
thinkp
(
x1,
see(x2,x3)
)
c.
x1 x2 x3
j1 girl1 girl1 girl2
j2 girl2 girl2 girl1
This correctly gives us the wide scope reading. Moreover, if we interpret the coref-
erence relation between x1 and x2 collectively (so ∪x1 = ∪x2), we get the crossed
reading. Again, we think that the existence of the crossed reading is vindicated by
the facts. (35–37) show some examples from the web.
(35) Jennifer Lawrence & Emma Stone Reveal They Thought They Catfished Each
Other & More in Hilarious Joint Interview6
(36) Sometimes the two leads meet and become involved initially, then must
confront challenges to their union. Sometimes they are hesitant to become
romantically involved because they believe that they do not like each other,
because one of them already has a partner, or because of social pressures.
However, the screenwriters leave clues that suggest that the characters are, in
fact, attracted to each other and that they would be a good love match.7
(37) He thought she hated him. She thought he hated her. They thought they hated
each other.8
In (37), admittedly, it is not clear whether the last sentence is intended to bring new
information or to summarize the two previous sentences. But the fact that the latter
reading is possible shows that it is possible to get a crossed reading of the reciprocal.
6 http://www.shineon-media.com/2018/01/05/jennifer-lawrence-emma-stone-reveal-they-thought-they-catfished-each-other-more-in-hilarious-joint-interview/
7 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romantic_comedy
8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RcKC7V-Thu4
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Our account of the wide scope reading relies on each other being interpreted de
re in the matrix DRS. Hellan (1981: 70) already showed that this is needed in other
cases of binding into an NP that is interpreted de re.
(38) a. Martin
Martin
tror
thinks
Ola
Olai
skal
is going to
gifte seg med
marry
sin
hisi
egen
own
kone.
wife.
On the most natural reading of (38), sin egen kone is interpreted de re, which means
that we need to lift it to the matrix DRS.
(39)
x1 x2 x3 x4
martin(x1)
ola(x2)
x2 = x3
wi f e(x4,x3)
thinks
(
x1, marry(x2,x4)
)
We conclude that lifting the interpretation of the coreference requirement associated
with a bound anaphor is a legitimate and necessary operation. The details of how to
implement this lifting will vary depending on what assumptions one makes about
the syntax-semantics interface.
Because our account is based on dynamic binding, we correctly predict that long
distance reciprocity does not require c-command. Consider (40) from Dimitriadis
2000: 58.
(40) The lawyers who represent John and Mary think they will sue each other.
(40) has a long distance reading where John’s lawyer thinks “John will sue Mary”
and Mary’s lawyer thinks “Mary will sue John”. We are only aware of one previous
account that can get this reading, namely Dimitriadis 2000. Dimitriadis assumes that
they in this sentence is a paycheck pronoun denoting a function from lawyers to their
clients. Our analysis avoids that assumption, since John and Mary are accessible,
ordinary antecedents for they, so we get the two readings in the same way as above,
as illustrated in (41).
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(41) a.
x1 x2 x3 x4
lawyers.o f (x1,x2)
john.and.mary(x2)
x3 = x2
∪x4 = ∪x3
x4 6= x3
thinkp
(
x1, sue(x3,x4)
)
b.
x1 x2
lawyers.o f (x1,x2)
john.and.mary(x2)
think
(
x1,
x3 x4
x3 = x2
∪x4 = ∪x3
x4 6= x3
sue(x3,x4)
)
Both DRSs are compatible with the plural information state in (42).
(42)
x1 x2 x3 x4
j1 lawyer1 john john mary
j2 lawyer2 mary mary john
For the wide scope reading, the effect of thinkp is that the doxastic alternatives of
lawyer1 must be compatible with the embedded DRS as interpreted in { j1}, and
the doxastic alternatives of lawyer2 must be compatible with the embedded DRS
as interpreted in { j2}, that is John’s lawyer must think John will sue Mary and
Mary’s lawyer must think Mary will sue John. For the narrow scope reading, the
doxastic alternatives of both lawyers must be consistent with the embedded DRS
as interpreted in the whole plural information state { j1, j2}, i.e. both lawyers must
think that Mary will sue John and John will sue Mary.
Moreover, unlike accounts based on a scoping quantifier, we do not predict that
scope islands influence the availability of long distance readings. This is borne out
by examples like (43).
(43) It isn’t necessary for Israelis and Palestinians to get misty-eyed when they
imagine each other’s suffering (though that might help).9
≈ It isn’t necessary for Israelis to get misty-eyed when they imagine the
Palestinians’ suffering and it isn’t necessary for the Palestinians to get misty-
eyed whey they imagine the Israelis’ suffering.
5 Conclusions
Dotlacˇil and Murray convincingly argued that reciprocal pronouns are just pronouns,
and not quantifiers, and showed that there is an elegant model of such pronouns in
9 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/08/moral-imagination-and-the-fate-of-the-world/
260789/
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plural CDRT. Long distance readings remained unaccounted for, however. Part of
the problem is that the simple coindexation approach to anaphoric resolution is not
fine-grained enough to model the two different readings without additional structure.
We have shown that the more sophisticated account of anaphoricity that is found in
partial CDRT directly gives us an account of long distance readings while preserving
the advantages of the plural CDRT account of reciprocity.
Questions remain for the pronominal approach to reciprocals, however. Recip-
rocal sentences are famously associated with readings of different strength. For
example, The boys know each other seems to entail that each boy knows all the
others, whereas there is no such entailment in The boys stared at each other. In
quantifier theories, this is typically modelled as variable strength of quantification.
In the pronoun theory, there is no similarly obvious place to locate the ambiguity.
We leave this matter for further research.
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